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Abstract 
This paper seeks to identify the effect of the implementation of the European Working 
Time Directive (EWTD) on the working hours of UK doctors. The Labour Force 
Survey is used to compare the working hours of doctors with a variety of control 
groups before and after the implementation of the directive. The controls include 
those unconstrained by the directive and doctor counterparts working in Europe. We 
use differences-in-differences and matching methods to estimate the impact of this 
natural experiment, distinguishing between the anticipation and enactment of the 
EWTD. We find that the legislation reduced the hours of senior doctors by around 8 
hours in total including the component attributable to anticipation effects and allowing 
for (exogenously set) rising wages. 
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 1.  Introduction 
 
In September 1993, the European Commission introduced the European Working 
Time Directive (EWTD) in an attempt to curb excessive work hours. It required all 
EU Member States to implement the EWTD by November 1996. In 1994, the UK 
Conservative government challenged the legality of the directive as a health and 
safety law in the European Court of Justice. Just prior to the 1996 deadline, the 
government lost the court case but failed to implement the EWTD prior to leaving 
office in May 1997. The legislation was finally implemented by the incoming Labour 
government in October 1998,  after a significant administrative delay.  
 
The objective of the current paper is to identify the impact of the implementation of 
the EWTD on the working hours of UK doctors. The paper uses data from the UK 
Labour Force Survey (UK LFS) and the European Labour Force Survey (EU LFS) to 
obtain estimates of pre and post intervention, that is, the hours worked before and 
after implementation of the EWTD.  We treat the legislative enactment as a natural 
experiment and use differences-in-differences methods to identify the causal impact of 
the EWTD. We also compare results using propensity score matching techniques to 
estimate the treatment impact.  
 
The EWTD was introduced across Europe in 1993 with enactment in the UK delayed 
until 1998. When the European Commission introduced the EWTD, there was a clear 
expectation of the inevitability that the directive would be implemented in the UK. 
The decline in UK doctors’ working hours between 1994 and 1998 clearly indicates 
that the legislation was anticipated with hospitals attempting to bring doctor’s hours in 
line with the EWTD prior to the enactment. We attempt to directly model this 
anticipation effect and distinguish it from the implementation effect. 
 
A further identification issue in establishing the impact of the EWTD on the reduction 
in working hours is the potential endogeneity problem associated with rising real 
wages of doctors during the implementation (and anticipation) period. This suggests 
that perhaps, not all the reduction in hours is due to the implementation of the EWTD. 
There may be an income effect. We can control for this as doctors’ wages in the UK 
are determined exogenously via annual pay uplifts as recommended by the Doctors 
and Dentists Pay Review Body in conjunction with the government.   
 
The current study focuses on senior doctors as the case of junior doctors is 
complicated by the interaction and overlap between the EWTD and the New Deal. 
The Medical Royal Colleges and the Department of Health (DoH) issued an 
 agreement in which the Conservative government, the Academy of Medical Royal 
Colleges, the NHS and the Junior Doctors Committee of the British Medical 
Association (BMA) approved the 'New Deal'. This agreement was designed to reduce 
hours of junior doctors to 56 a week for those in full shifts and to 72 for those on on-
call rotas. Compliance with the New Deal was to be achieved by December 31, 1996. 
Identifying the separate impact of the New Deal and the EWTD is beyond the scope 
of the current analysis. Rather we focus on the impact of EWTD on senior doctors.  
 
The next section provides the background of the EWTD. Section 3 overviews the 
literature while section 4 examines the distribution and trend in hours worked by UK 
doctors, as reported in the LFS. Section 5 describes differences-in-differences and 
propensity score matching methods. Section 6 presents the empirical estimates using a 
variety of control or quasi-control groups including EU doctors via the EU LFS data.   
2.  EWTD Background 
The European Commission implemented the EWTD in 1993 covering all full-time 
employees, with a special exemption for all non-senior doctors and transport workers. 
The original directive was extended in August 2000 to include junior doctors, doctors 
in training and transport workers but GPs were still excluded.
2 Full compliance in the NHS was expected to be achieved by the August 2009 
deadline. A major constraint on the propensity to limit working hours in the short run 
is that it takes between 12 and 15 years to train a specialist doctor. An enforced 15-
20% reduction in working time of doctors in training has important implications for 
either the skills acquired over conventional training durations or a necessary increase 
in total training time. 
 
The EWTD definition of working time is ‘any period during which the worker is 
working, at the employer’s disposal and carrying out his or her activity or duties’. The 
main feature of the directive was the imposition of an upper bound of 48 hours of 
work per week (averaged over a 17 week reference period). Other requirements were: 
11 hours continuous rest in 24 hours; 24 hours continuous rest in seven days (or 48 
hours in 14 days); a 20 minute break required in work periods of over 6 hours; four 
weeks of annual leave and for night workers an average of no more than 8 hours work 
in 24 over the reference period.   
 
In normal circumstances, senior doctors were not expected to work more than the 
weekly average of 48 hours on a regular basis. However, there were many cases 
where doctors exceeded the maximum work hours limit. In these situations, they had 
 to formally sign an opt-out agreement. The greater the fraction of doctors who opt out, 
the easier it becomes for Primary Care Trusts (PCT) to comply with the requirements 
of the EWTD. However no employer could compel their workers to sign the opt-out. 
 
The economics of the EWTD suggest it had several important effects. Firstly, it 
generated a supply response from the government. Secondly, it caused a change in 
how hospitals organise their working teams.  Thirdly, it generated a behavioural 
response from hospital management and individual doctors.  
 
On the supply response of the government, there was a large increase in the number of 
consultants and senior hospital doctors between 1997 and 2004, 43% and 38% 
respectively3. In addition over 10,000 more doctors from overseas were hired over the 
period 1999 to 2004. In anticipation of the falling hours of all doctors (and in the face 
of increasing demand for healthcare) the government also opened seven new medical 
schools to meet the extra future demand for doctors4.   
 
The reality of the introduction of the EWTD was that it changed the way in which 
hospitals organise their working teams and hence how hospital doctors worked. A 
straightforward, if anecdotal, account of this is given by Pemberton (2012)5:  
‘Prior to the legislation …. Junior doctors were attached to a team, typically 
composed of a newly qualified doctor (junior house officer), a senior house officer, a 
registrar and a consultant. This ‘firm’ as it was called, was a tried and tested way of 
delivering patient care. …. But all this was wiped away …. The elaborate and 
abstruse rotas that have replaced the usual ‘on-call’ system for doctors ---- has meant 
that…. juniors are no longer attached to a particular consultant or team – rather they 
float between teams, providing cover.’ 
 
The third change is on the behavioural side.  It has been documented that doctors, 
have always, and will still work the hours which are necessary to get the job done and 
that this may mean manipulating the official recording of hours.  
In a candid anecdote Pemberton (2012)6 recounts: 
‘To add insult to injury the hours haven't really changed…… The hours we work are 
supposed to be monitored on ‘diary cards’, which are forms that are completed by the 
doctor every few months, giving a snapshot of their working pattern…. So there is an 
implicit – and sometimes explicit – pressure put on doctors by management ……. to be 
creative on their monitoring forms. ’ 
 
 Later in this paper we will see statistical evidence of the effect of these practices in 
terms of reported unpaid overtime over the period 1989-2010. We also examine the 
overall impact of the EWTD legislation on work hours. 
 
 
3. The Context 
From a theoretical perspective the reduction in working hours may represent either a 
constraint on individual choice or an instrument to match preferences for lower work 
hours. There are several papers that examine a reduction of working hours; we briefly 
consider only those most relevant to the current study.  
 
Crepon et al (2002) studied the effect of the 1982 mandatory reduction of weekly 
working hours from 40 to 39 in France. They used the differences-in-differences 
technique and found that minimum-wage workers were strongly affected by the 
reduction in hours. Estevao et al (2006) study the consequences of a reduction in the 
length of the working week in France from 39 to 35 hours applicable to large firms in 
2000 and small firms in 2002. They find that workers in large firms transitioned to 
small firms and were replaced by cheaper individuals as hourly wages increased in 
large firms. The employment of workers affected by the reduction declined, although 
the net impact on aggregate employment was insignificant.  
 
A major issue in our analysis is to allow for anticipation effects, i.e. behavioural 
responses that predate the implementation of the policy. Some papers in the literature 
have considered this issue but often explicitly rule out the possibility by avoiding use 
of data for periods where anticipation effects are expected.  
 
Francesconi and van der Klaauw (2004) allow for behavioural responses in the period 
following the announcement of the reform, up to its actual implementation. They find 
that the timing of responses corresponds closely to those of the government’s 
announcements of the planned introduction of the reform. The present paper is in the 
same spirit as we allow for non-zero effects for a time prior to the policy being 
implemented, the so-called ‘Ashenfelter dip’. Ashenfelter (1978) identified the role of 
anticipation effects, i.e. how an announced upcoming training programme may 
behaviourally change participation in the program and subsequent employment (or 
earnings) prior to the intervention.  They show that this effect may influence the 
estimated impact effect of the policy. Reinowski et al (2004) evaluate the effects of 
training on individual unemployment duration. They use the pre-history of 
 employment status as an indicator of the employment probability before the start of 
the programme, in order to eliminate the Ashenfelter Dip. Mueser et al (2003) took 
differences for periods around the implementation of the policy to overcome the 
Ashenfelter dip. 
 
In the original context the Ashenfelter Dip is due to participants in the programme 
having a materially different wage or employment outcome from non-participants just 
prior to entrance into the programme.  In our case the ‘Dip’ is due to anticipation of 
the need to comply – at some future date –erring on the side of caution and 
conforming prior to the deadline. This is somewhat different from a composition of 
the sample effect, but to all intents and purposes the result in modelling terms is the 
same – namely that we observe some change in the outcome variable (here EWTD 
hours compliance) prior to the date that it is legally required. 
 
In the current context we are concerned not with behavioural participation decisions 
for an impending active labour market intervention – but rather a tendency to move in 
the direction of compliance with a new workplace law prior to its legal enactment. So 
here we consider potential adaptation of working practices before the legal 
introduction of the policy. This could be the hiring of more (or reorganisation of 
existing) hospital staff, the rearrangement of working teams and on call rotas as the 
implementation deadline comes closer, as well as dry runs to investigate how a given 
hospital may cope with reducing the hours of doctors. 
 
In what follows we estimate the impact of the implementation of the EWTD on the 
working hours of doctors and include the possibility of anticipation effects. Previous 
papers which examine anticipation effects do so only in the year immediately prior to 
the introduction of the reform. In our study, anticipation effects are likely to occur 
over a period of five years, due to pre-announcement, and we model this accordingly.  
 
4. Descriptive Analysis  
The UK LFS is a continuous survey with a sample drawn each quarter of around 
60,000 households from the postcode address file. The survey was initiated in 1973 
and conducted every two years until 1983. Between 1984 and 1991, the data was 
collected annually and has been running in its present form, with quarterly sampling, 
since spring 1992. For the quarterly sampling the year is divided into quarters of 13 
weeks. For each quarter the reference weeks are distributed uniformly. A rotation 
system comprising 5 quarters is used. Respondents are questioned 5 times at 13 week 
 intervals and one-fifth of the sample is replaced each quarter7. We use yearly data 
(based on the 4 quarters). The survey contains details on gender, wages (hourly, 
weekly and monthly), hours worked (basic, overtime and total)8, education, ethnicity, 
age, occupation, nationality, employment status and an indicator for part-time or full-
time status9. 
 
Using the LFS data, we examine the distribution of total working hours of senior 
doctors, i.e.  basic plus paid and unpaid overtime. In Figure 1 we graph the 
distribution over 3 different periods; 1989 to 1993 prior to anticipation or 
implementation of the EWTD, from 1994 to 1998, the anticipation period, and finally, 
1999 to 2010 is the post EWTD implementation period.  After the introduction of the 
EWTD there is a clear leftward drift in the working hours distribution over time: the 
fraction of doctors who work over 70 hours a week falls dramatically, with a decrease 
in the median hours from 60 to 55 to 51 over the three time periods, and the 
proportion of senior doctors working more than the reference 48 hours per week 
declines. It is clear that hours worked by senior doctors started to fall in anticipation 
of the directive being implemented in the UK.  
 
Figure 2 distinguishes the time trend of basic, overtime and total working hours of UK 
senior doctors. We find that basic hours worked remain close to constant. Variations in 
total working hours correspond to variations in overtime hours. We next examine the 
time pattern of paid and unpaid overtime separately; this indicates whether doctors 
substitute (official) paid overtime with (unofficial) unpaid overtime, in order to meet 
reporting requirements. Figure 3 illustrates the decline in overtime is largely driven by 
reductions in paid overtime, while unpaid overtime is only slightly reduced. One can 
also see that after 2001, unpaid overtime dominates paid overtime. The focus of the 
current paper is on the impact of the EWTD on actual hours worked rather than on the 
change in reporting behaviour. Thus, in consequence, we aggregate paid and unpaid 
overtime in our analysis.  
 
In 1994, the UK Conservative government challenged the legality of the EWTD as a 
health and safety law in the European Court of Justice. However, the hospital 
authorities possibly surmised that the Conservative government would lose the court 
battle and that the EWTD would be implemented by 1996. Consequently, in order to 
meet the target hours by the compliance date, doctors’ working hours decreased 
dramatically. However in November 1996, the government announced that the 
directive would not be implemented during their term, doctors once again, gradually, 
increased their working hours.  
 
 This state of affairs continued after the Conservatives lost the general election in May 
1997 and the Labour government, which voted in favour of EWTD, took office. This 
uncertainty allows us to attribute changes in working hours of doctors, between 1994 
and 1998, to the anticipation of the EWTD being implemented. In October 1998, the 
EWTD was implemented in the UK by the Labour government. Table 1 highlights 
that the mean of total hours of senior doctors fell by around 2 hours a week between 
1994 and 1998 due to anticipation of the directive being implemented in UK. Once 
the EWTD was implemented, there is a further significant decline in work hours of 
around 4 hours between 1998 and 99. However, an alarming 65% of senior doctors 
continue to work more than 48 hours per week. This is due, at least in part, to the 
voluntary opt-out clause. 
 
From August 2000, doctors further reduced their total hours as it was announced full 
compliance with the EWTD was to be achieved by August 2009. In November 2002, 
a range of schemes were introduced to assist the hiring of doctors and this saw a large 
influx of doctors in 2003. The NHS Modernisation Annual Board Report of 2003 
suggested that around 3500 doctors benefited from this scheme. Since more nurses 
were being trained and recruited than doctors, they were left to deliver a range of new 
services and treatments that were once only offered in hospitals. Since 2003, hours 
worked have shown a clear tendency to fall, (with only small increases in 2006 and 
2008), in order to comply with the work hour limits of the EWTD. 
 
5. Statistical Models 
5.1 Differences-in-Differences 
Implementation of the EWTD may be viewed as a quasi-experiment with the 
differences-in-differences technique used to estimate its impact. The simplest 
regression analysis is based on comparison of outcomes in groups before and after the 
EWTD was implemented. Assume that there are two groups indexed by treatment 
level, ௜ܶ = 0, 1 where 0 is assigned to those who do not receive treatment (control 
group), and 1 to those who receive the treatment (treatment group).  
 
Individuals are observed over three time periods, t = P, A, R where P refers to the 
period prior to anticipation and implementation, henceforth labelled prior, A 
represents the anticipation period and R refers to reform period, after implementation 
of the EWTD. In our notation we will need to refer to the end points of each of these 
 windows – which we denote by p, a and r respectively (and represent schematically in 
Figure 4).  
Our reduced form DiD estimating equation is: 
  
ܧሺݕ௜௧ሻ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ ௜ܺ଴ ൅ ߛ ௜ܶ ൅ ߙ௔ܣ ൅ ߙ௥ܴ ൅ ߜ௔ܣ ∗ ௜ܶ ൅ ߜ௥ܴ ∗ ௜ܶ ൅ ߮݀௧ 
 
where ௜ܺ଴ is the set of controls for individual i in the base year, which is the year 
when the individual entered the survey. The common controls are: age, age-squared, 
gender, marital status, age left full-time education, qualification (degree holder or 
not), ethnicity, nationality (UK national or not), a large company control (if firm size 
was greater than 250 employees or not) and tenure10. The treatment indicator is ௜ܶ 
which takes the value 1 if the person is a doctor who is observed in the EWTD year. 
Regarding the time periods of our data, the reference period is in the Pre-Anticipation 
Window, A is a dummy variable indicating that the year is in the Anticipation window 
(A=1, and zero otherwise) and R is a dummy variable indicating that the year is in the 
Implementation window (R=1, and zero otherwise). The dt corresponds to the year 
effects (year dummies). The DiD interaction terms we are interested in are ߜ௔ܣ ∗ ௜ܶ, 
and ߜ௥ܴ ∗ ௜ܶ  which represent the effect of the treatment on the treated in the 
Anticipation Window and the Implementation Window respectively. A graphical 
interpretation of these coefficients is provided in Figure 411.  
 
An important assumption we need to make in this DiD framework to extend the 
analysis to a three period model to incorporate the effects of Pre-Anticipation, 
Anticipation and the Implementation windows is that we can assume that the effects 
of these windows are additively separable.  Clearly this would not be the case if the 
length or effect of these windows was endogenously determined.  Fortunately in our 
case the windows were announced exogenously and fixed before the behaviour and 
decisions of the NHS hospitals and doctors are observed. 
 
In order to identify the reduction in doctors’ hours due to anticipation of the EWTD 
being implemented in the UK, let yTip and yTia be sample averages of the outcome for 
the treatment group before and after anticipation respectively, and let yCip and yCia be 
the equivalent sample averages of the outcome for the control group. Therefore, the 
differences-in-differences estimator will be:  
 
a = (yTia - yTip) - (yCia - yCip).  
 
 Similarly, to identify the reduction in hours worked due to implementation of the 
EWTD, let yTia and yTir be the sample averages of outcome for the treatment group 
before and after implementation of the EWTD respectively, and yCia and yCir be the 
sample averages after implementation of the EWTD. Then, the differences-in-
differences estimator is: 12  
 
r = (yTir - yTia) - (yCir - yCia). 
 
The legitimacy of the approach requires that there are no shocks occurring in the 
prior-period which affect working hours for the control and treatment groups 
differently. This means, that literally any factors which impact on working hours 
affect both treatment and control groups in the same ‘parallel or common’ way. 
Provided this ‘common trends’ assumption holds, the reaction of employees in the 
control groups will give us a benchmark estimate of how the employees in the 
treatment group would respond in the absence of the implementation of the policy.  
 
A potential problem with differences-in-differences estimation is the failure of the 
common trends assumption. Also, if there are transitory shocks to the pre-intervention 
hours, it may bias the differences-in-differences estimator. The problems of estimating 
the effect of the EWTD in the presence of the ‘Ashenfelter dip’, where hours decrease 
due to anticipation prior to implementation, highlight the possible bias. In our 
analysis, we find that over the period 1994-1998 there has been a downward trend in 
the working hours of doctors. We interpret this trend from 1994 as due to doctors’ 
anticipation of EWTD being implemented in the UK. The total impact of the 
enactment is thus the decline in hours associated with anticipation of the reform, plus 
the impact of actual implementation. In order to control for the possibility of the 
existence of a trend before the EWTD was introduced, we experimented with 
including a time trend. Our results suggest that this time trend has no significant effect 
on the analysis. However, we try to control for any policy-independent time trend in 
our statistical analysis. Inclusion of this variable deals with endogeneity of the 
intervention variable but does not reduce the issue of potential serial correlation. 
 
Most papers adopting a differences-in-differences method do not solve the potential 
problem of serial correlation13. The practical problem– as here – is lack of time 
periods in the data to adequately model the temporal variation and potential non-
stationarity of the underlying time series. In the current context with 21 annual 
observations we simply do not have enough data to model any potential serial 
correlation in either the anticipation or reform period or both. This may mean that our 
standard errors of our estimates may be biased downwards – but this effect is 
 minimised here as we report robust standard errors. The simplest method used to 
compute consistent standard errors, and which the paper employs, is to ‘bypass’ the 
time series element by aggregating data for each period, then running our regression 
equation on this averaged outcome variable in a panel of length 3. This enables us to 
obtain the estimate of the impact of the policy and its standard error directly from the 
regression14.  
 
It is known that the estimate of the causal effect via differences-in-differences may be 
biased due to self-selection issues. The present paper examines the application of 
propensity score matching to correct for sample selection bias that may exist due to 
observable differences between the treatment and the comparison groups.  
 
5.2 Propensity Score Matching 
Statistical matching is a natural ‘weighting system’ that provides an unbiased estimate 
of the treatment effect. It involves selecting and pairing treatment and comparison 
units based solely on observable characteristics. The average effect of the treatment 
can then be computed as the mean difference in outcomes between treated and their 
matched control. When differences between two units are fully captured via 
observable covariates, matching provides an unbiased estimate of the treatment 
impact subject to the following assumptions : (1) conditional independence, which 
requires that assignment to the treatment or control group is based solely on 
observables (i.e., conditional on observable characteristics, the probability of being in 
the treatment or control group is independent of the outcome (hours worked) 
variable), (2) the balancing condition, which requires that observable and 
unobservable characteristics are (given control variables) equally distributed in the 
treatment and control group and (3) common support, which requires that there is an 
overlap of people in the treatment and control conditions, that is, a given individual 
needs to have a positive probability of being in both groups.  
 
Our data and empirical analysis fulfils the basic requirements for the appropriate use 
of the PSM technique. Namely we have: a meaningful set of covariates which 
characterise the full set of observable characteristics which may directly affect the 
probability of working less hours; a reasonable common support of the treatment and 
control groups estimated propensity score distribution; and thirdly that the matched 
treatment and control groups have similar values of the covariates.  By way of caveats 
– as we would expect – the common support is not identical and the summary 
statistics on the observables are not completely concordant. The range of propensity 
scores, which may be used to check for the common support condition, overlap, but is 
 clearly not the same. Further details are provided in Figure A1 and A2 in the 
Appendix. Here we can clearly see the difference in the treatment and control 
populations (Figure A1), but the close overlap in the propensity scores of the treated 
and matched controls.  Furthermore, there may also be unobservable characteristics, 
which may differentiate treatment and control groups, e.g. if many doctors are a 
special (e.g. particularly caring) type of individual not found in the control groups. 
However, while this limits the power of our propensity-score-matching results, it 
provides a valuable addition to our difference-in-difference analysis. 
5.3         Treatment and Control Groups 
 
In any observational study, the treatment and control groups are drawn from different 
populations. Both groups must have a fairly similar distribution of the pre-
intervention variables. The paper examines a number of control groups employed full 
time from the public and private sector in order to estimate the impact of the 
implementation of the EWTD on the hours worked by UK senior doctors.  
 
First we considered transport workers as a potential control. When senior doctors 
were included in the EWTD at the time of its introduction in September 1993, 
transport workers were exempt. Transport workers are included in the directive in 
2000 but subject to it only from 2003. Therefore, the periods where we can capture 
the real effects of changes in total working hours are during the 1998-1999 and 1999-
2000 window. Unfortunately this rules out Transport as a viable control group. This 
necessitates the investigation of alternative control groups that will capture the policy 
effects through the 1999-2010 periods. 
 
Our alternative control groups are classified as quasi-controls, who are observed from 
1989 to 2010. These are full-time workers who are affected by the EWTD but for 
whom the directive did not bind, that is, hours worked by these groups were already 
less than the maximum target of 48. The study primarily concentrates on the hours 
worked by senior professionals for whom this is the case –nurses from the public 
sector and accountants and the legal service staff from the private sector. Appendix 
Table 1 presents sample means of characteristics for treatment and control groups15. 
 
The differences-in-differences estimates capture the number of additional hours 
doctors work, relative to the control groups after anticipation or implementation of the 
EWTD. The interaction term indicates the number of hours reduced as a result of any 
anticipation or implementation of the EWTD. Summing the coefficients obtained 
 from the interaction and the treatment terms provides the number of hours that doctors 
would work in the absence of any anticipation or implementation of the EWTD.  
6. Empirical Analysis 
6.1 Differences-in-Differences 
Employing differences-in-differences analysis is the most natural technique to identify 
the impact of the EWTD. To verify the results obtained, the study also makes use of 
propensity score matching techniques to analyse post-treatment hours. By 
implementing both methods we may compare results.   
 
The investigation examines differences in the total working hours of the treatment and 
the control groups due to the enactment of the EWTD. We identify two distinct 
components i.e. reduction in hours worked due to anticipation of the EWTD and 
reduction in hours worked due to implementation of the EWTD. Table 2 identifies the 
two components; the sum of the two interaction terms represents the total impact. For 
the Implementation Effect, we consider the years from 1989 to 1998 as the before 
period and the years from 1999 to 2010 as the after period. For the Anticipation 
Effect, we consider the years between 1989 and 1993 as the before period and years 
between 1994 and 1998 as the after period.  
 
As reflected in Table 2, estimates from our study reveal that both anticipation and 
implementation of the EWTD led to a significant reduction in the hours worked by 
senior doctors. We observe that senior doctors reduce between 4 and 5 hours per week 
due to their anticipation of the EWTD (Anticipation Effect). We also find an 
additional reduction of between 3 and 4 hours per week due to the implementation of 
the EWTD (Implementation Effect). The total effect of EWTD is thus between 8 and 
9 hours, i.e. this represents the number of hours senior doctors now work, per week, 
more than the control groups. Table 2 shows how the size of these effects changes as 
our control group varies – between: Accountants, Nurses and the Legal Services.  We 
have no particular reason to favour any single group and so prefer the estimates which 
combine these three control groups to give overall effects around 4.5 hours for the 
Anticipation Effect and 3.5 hours for the Implementation Effect with a total effect of 
approximately 8 hours. Finally, summing anticipation and implementation effects with 
the treatment parameter provides an estimate of the difference in hours worked 
between doctors and the controls if the policy had not been introduced. For the 
aggregated control group this sum is around 15 hours per week. 
 
 
 6.2 Propensity Score Matching 
  
When the differences between any two units are captured in the observable covariates, 
matching provides an unbiased estimate of the treatment impact. For each individual 
in the treatment group, a matched individual is selected from the comparison group. 
The average effect of treatment is then computed as the mean difference in the 
outcomes between the treated and control. We match the treatment and control groups 
to check how many hours the treated units work more than control units. We also 
include benchmark estimates of the treatment impact16 to check how close matching 
results are to these estimates (Table 3). The development of hours worked for 
treatment and control groups is also illustrated in Figure 5. 
 
In the empirical analysis we match with replacement and produce results using kernel, 
nearest-neighbour and caliper (radius) matching methods. Our benchmark estimates 
show that the employees of the treatment group work around 18 hours a week more 
than the employees of the control group before the anticipation and implementation of 
the EWTD (p-period)17, 14 hours per week more during the anticipation period (the a-
period) and 11 hours a week more since the implementation of the EWTD (the r-
period). Estimates derived from the alternative matching methods reveal that the 
number of hours the treatment units work more than control units is generally less, but 
close to the benchmark estimates. These estimates capture the total difference between 
the treatment and control groups in the different time periods.  Therefore – to 
calculate the effects of the Anticipation and Implementation of the EWTD separately 
we must subtract these estimates from our baseline differences between the two 
groups prior to either the Anticipation or Implementation of the reform. The 
respective numbers are included in the last column of Table 3. They can be interpreted 
as similar to ߜ௔ and ߜ௥	of the Diff-in-Diff analysis. Of all techniques used, estimates 
from caliper (radius) matching represent the smallest effect and hence are more 
conservative with respect of the policy effect. They are around 14 hours a week 
during the anticipation period and range from 10 to 11 hours a week during the reform 
period. The results suggest that implementation of the EWTD led to a reduction in the 
hours of senior doctors by around 3 a week. The anticipation effect is less clear, 
showing a decrease when considering nearest neighbour and Kernel matching, but 
essentially no decrease using caliper (radius) matching methods.  
 
In conclusion we have slightly smaller estimates of the effects of the EWTD from our 
PSM estimation than from our Diff-in-Diff estimation for the implementation effect.  
 The contrast in the estimates is not large in view of the different assumptions involved 
in the two techniques, indicating the robustness of results. 
 
6.3 Wages 
 
We have established that the hours worked by senior doctors declined due to the 
anticipation and the implementation of the EWTD. However, our analysis so far 
ignores the potential role of an increase in wages in the reduction in the doctors 
working hours. The Doctors and Dentists Review Body (DDRB) is responsible for 
setting the pay of doctors and dentists in the NHS which invites evidence from the 
BMA and the government and then decides how much doctors’ pay should rise in the 
following year. 
 
The UK LFS contains information on wages only from 1993 (and so this limits our 
capacity to compare estimates of a model controlling for wages –Table 4 with Table 2 
which did not control for wages). Figure 6 reveals how the wages of doctors have 
changed over the years, plotting the development of wages as observed, as well as the 
development of wages relative to the recommendation of the DDRB (if the DDRB 
recommendation would have been exactly followed, the lower line would be a 
horizontal line). Wages rise over time, but not when compared relative to the DDRB 
recommendation.  
 
Considering the effect of increases recommended by the DDRB, wages appear to 
decrease rather than increase. The discrepancy is due to demographic changes in the 
composition of the senior doctor group or other structural changes increments or the 
rate at which older senior doctors retire compared to the rate at which junior doctors 
are recruited. The difference between these two wage trends over the period therefore 
amount to ‘wage drift’. This wage drift is also exogenous as it is determined by 
demographic forces which change the composition of the senior doctor workforce. We 
condition on real wages as an additional variable in our model and separately identify 
the income effect of higher wages from the effect of the implementation of the 
EWTD.  
 
Results from Table 4 indicate that the hourly wage does not significantly affect the 
hours worked by senior doctors. The estimates still reveal that senior doctors reduce 
both total and overtime hours by about 4 a week due to the implementation (when 
again taking all control groups into account – samples are different due to the 
 availability of wage data, the same reason which also does not allow to include the 
pre-period in the analysis). It can also be seen that the reduction in hours is mainly 
due to the reduction in overtime hours. These estimates are comparable to the ones 
obtained using differences-in-differences (Table 2). Given the insignificance of the 
coefficient we can be confident that the reduction in hours is not a result of an income 
effect of higher wages. 
 
6.4 European Labour Force Survey (EU LFS) 
 
A further robustness check is provided by comparing the treated UK doctors with their 
European counterparts (controls). We examine working hours of doctors in six EU 
Member States between 1992 and 2003. Figure 7 shows that the doctors in these 
countries do not work more than 48 hours a week. The aggregate working hours of 
senior doctors is about 40 hours a week every year. This implies that even though the 
EWTD was implemented to cover all occupations in all Member States in 1993, it did 
not bind on the working hours of doctors in these countries. Hence, they too can be 
considered as valid control groups. Our regression specification, simply adds a 
country control for the different European Member States. 
 
It is important to recall that the time frame used for analysing post treatment hours of 
UK doctors, using the doctors of the EU Member States as the control groups, is much 
shorter than previously considered. Due to data availability the analysis is restricted to 
using periods between 1992 and 200318.  
 
The estimates, once again, highlight that the implementation of the EWTD had a 
significant impact on the working hours of UK senior doctors. Since the 
implementation of the EWTD, senior doctors in the UK have reduced the weekly 
number of hours they work by 2 and work only 16 hours more than European senior 
doctors between years 1999 and 2003.  
 
Table 5 indicates the matching results when comparing UK senior doctors to the EU 
senior doctors. We first include benchmark estimates of the treatment impact to check 
how close matching results are to this estimate. ATT estimates from kernel matching 
are closer to benchmark estimates than estimates obtained from nearest-neighbour and 
caliper (radius) matching. It is observed that UK doctors work 16 hours a week more 
than EU doctors due to implementation of the EWTD and around 18 hours a week 
more due to the anticipation of the implementation of the EWTD in the UK. This 
 implies that the senior doctors reduced their hours by 2 hours a week due to 
implementation of the EWTD  
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
The implementation of the EWTD in 1993 across Europe introduced a 48 hour upper 
limit for the working week for full time employees. The directive was however only 
implemented in the UK in October 1998. While a majority of the employees in the 
UK worked less than the desired target, doctors continued to work more than 48 hours 
a week. This paper has assessed the impact of the EWTD on the working hours of 
doctors. 
 
Our evaluation shows that the impact of the reduction in the standard working week is 
relatively large. For senior doctors, we observe that the total number of hours worked 
reduced by 4.5 hours a week due to the anticipation and another 3.5 due to the 
implementation of the EWTD based on Diff-in-Diff estimates. While these results 
may slightly overstate the effect, at least the reduction due to the implementation was 
also around 3 hours based on PSM results. Similar results are also obtained when 
comparing the working hours of UK doctors to European doctors. Moreover, we have 
identified that the (exogenously changing) wage rate does not affect the hours worked 
by doctors. Estimates still reveal that the senior doctors reduce their working hours by 
about 4 a week due to the implementation of the policy. This leads us to suggest that 
this reduction in hours is not a result of income effect of higher wages. 
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Footnotes 
i
  We thank Maaz Khan for research support and the reviewers at the 
Economics of the Health Workforce Conference for helpful comments. 
 
2
   For junior doctors hours restrictions were to be phased in over five 
years with hours reduced from 58 in 2004 to 56 in 2007 and finally to 48 in 2009. 
 
 
3
   Reported by the Department of Health (2005). Also see Talbot-Smith 
and Pollock (2006) chapter 8 for further details. 
 
 
4
   New medical schools opened at Exeter/Plymouth, Norwich, Warwick 
in 2000, Durham in 2001, Brighton and Sussex in 2002, Hull/York in 2003 and 
Lancaster in 2004. 
 
 
5
   Pemberton (2012) p39-40. This selective quote is abbreviated by the 
present authors for brevity. 
 
 
6
   Pemberton (2012) p41. This selective quote is abbreviated by the 
present authors for brevity. 
 
7
   Households are interviewed face-to-face in the first quarter (when they 
are included) and later by telephone. The response rate is 77.5% for first wave, with 
68% of non-responses being due to refusals. 
 
8
   Total hours are defined as basic hours including only paid overtime. 
For our analysis however, we define total hours as basic hours plus paid and unpaid 
overtime hours. 
 
9
   Our main variable of interest in the paper is hours worked. Some 
recent literature discusses the potential problem of mis-measurement of hours in 
surveys. Baum-Snow and Neal (2009) describe that respondents may under-report 
hours worked if the interviewer is not physically present. In the UK LFS, however, all 
participants are familiarised with the survey in a face-to-face interview, while only 
later waves with the same participant are (on participants’ request) done on the phone. 
This should improve the data quality. Furthermore, we mainly look at differences 
between years. As the procedure for conducting the survey has not changed over time, 
                                                                                                                                             
any remaining measurement error should leave our results unaffected. Another issue 
could be fluctuations in hours worked compared to hours paid over the business cycle, 
as described by Aaronson and Figura (2010). However, again our results should be 
only minimally affected by the business cycle in the private sector, as public-sector 
doctor services follow seasonal rather than revenue-based cycles, if anything. 
Furthermore, we do not focus on paid hours, but total paid and unpaid hours. Hence, 
unless reporting behaviour for hours worked fluctuates with the business cycle, our 
results should not be affected. 
 
10
   The variable tenure is a binary indicator equal to one if the doctor had 
worked 6 or more years for the current employer. 
 
11   
For purposes of simplicity the figure assumes that the working hours of 
the control group are constant. 
12
   To analyse the reduction in hours due to anticipation is 
straightforward: it is the effect of going from the p-state to the A-state. Whereas, when 
we compare the R-period to A-period, we are estimating the effect of going from the 
anticipation state to the state of actual reform. If we compare the r-period to the P+A 
period, then we are estimating the effect of going from some hybrid of ‘half no-
anticipation half anticipation’ state to full reform. This in our view is not very 
informative. The impact of the policy (the full step from the P-state to the R-state) is 
hence broken down into two steps: the step from the P-stage to the A-state, and then 
from the A-state to the R-state. The full impact of the policy is the sum of the two 
estimated effects. However, having it broken down is more useful and instructive. 
 
13
   The study conducted by Bertrand et al (2004) identifies three factors 
that make serial correlation an important issue. Estimation relies on long time series – 
average of 16.5 years, the dependent variables are highly positively serially correlated 
and the treatment variable changes itself very little over time. 
 
14
   Dehejia et al (1999) use this approach and find that models power is 
low and falls with sample size. This is de facto the approach followed by all Diff-in 
Diff papers. It represents a way of aggregating the ‘before’ and ‘after’ periods 
assuming away the possibility of time series fluctuations which cannot, in practice be 
identified. 
 
15
   Since we have a large variation in total hours worked by senior 
doctors and observe linear trends in working hours of the control groups, it becomes 
easy to study the effect of anticipation and implementation of the EWTD on hours of 
doctors by comparing our treatment group to a selection of control groups by 
employing our estimation techniques.  
 
                                                                                                                                             
16
   This is obtained from carrying out difference in means in the working 
hours of the treatment and the control groups. This is achieved by regressing total 
hours worked on the treatment dummy variable. 
 
17   This is comparable to the figure of 15 derived from Table 2 i.e. the sum 
of interaction and treatment terms. 
    
 
18
  We use the years from 1994 to 1998 as the before period and from 
1999 to 2003 as the after period. Again, it is important to recall that the earlier 
analysis using the UK LFS considers periods between 1999 and 2010 as the after 
period to observe the number of hours reduced due to the implementation of the 
EWTD. 
  
 
